Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COIN. Show all posts

Aug 22, 2012

IO Sophistry -- 'Infiltrator' Redefined

Another volley in the BS IO.

A NATO study has found that nearly 90 percent of such killings stem from personal disputes or outrage rather than insurgent plots to infiltrate the security forces or use them as cover for attacks.

NFW.

John M. agrees that it is infiltrators.

It is clear that USG + MIL - in order to make their ridiculous IO narrative fly - have redefined "infiltrator" to mean someone who simply puts on a black market uniform and slips behind enemy lines to grease Coalition forces. I'm sure CI folks would object to such a limited definition. Even with such sophistry, the narrative proves false.

As we have argued for years (since the mess hall in Mosul, Iraq was blown up by someone mil announced was wearing a "black market uniform" - and investigation revealed to have been a infiltrated employee of the base), there is a determined information campaign to downplay the infiltrator problem in particular and the seriousness of insurgent challenges to post 9/11 US-led war efforts in general.

Domestic-facing Morale Operations do pay dividends. Ask many Americans who was the winner of the Iraq War and you will discover - to the surprise of everyone in the region - that it was the USA.

Indisputable that something like this is planned for our eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan.

AnglaVakt In Afghanistan

Another initiative, now a priority, is a program named “Guardian Angel.”

Also, notice that they have cleverly modified the "black market uniform" IO narrative. For the last month or so they have claimed that investigations determined that these are mostly not infiltrators (ridiculous on the face of it), but "disaffected" members of Afgh mil and police. They don't bother with the obvious implication if this was true - that treatment from US trainers or the shitty operational atmosphere or something equally bad was causing basically decent recruits to decide to turn on their Western allies.

They still do the "afghan uniform" misdirect in every case. Even when - as WaPo reported - the attacker wasn't even wearing a uniform. (The tea boy mentioned in NYT piece served the Afghan commander more than tea.)

US command has officially changed the designation from "green on blue attacks" to "insider attacks." And now we have this manpower-intensive "Guardian Angel" approach ...

The dire implications for the mission remain the same as when we first discussed the problem a couple of years ago. If our only hope for a decent exit from AF is to stand up a sizable security apparatus, and we have this disastrous "insider attacks" issue, we are fucked.

Hence, the only approach is to have a bullshit information operation to downplay the problem. 

Mar 22, 2012

Deconstructing & Construing/Rambling -- Inside the Works

Dog and pony show time.

Also, this.  Nice.  Castro knew of JFK assassination plan, book says

Since Oswald was known to the Cuban exile community as a pro-Castro agitator (a suspected anti-Castro plant at that), he was already on Cuban intel scope by Summer '63.  I doubt Castro would have wanted to get blamed for the assassination.

O's Mexico City visits to Cuban and Sov embassies can be nicely explained away by Latell's version.

One problem. Kennedy was starting to thaw the US/Cuban and US/USSR relationships at the time of his murder.

Best theory identifies extremist right-wing US elements.  Would have required participation of some USG assets to have orchestrated the cover-up (Warren Commission irregularities, autopsy skullduggery, media campaign, etc.)


De-construction: Rumblings from Meatball Works
-"Perhaps I shouldn't have dismissed the kinetic IO angle.
That would mean not "retaliation", but a loud and clear warning to villagers over there against cooperating with enemy in the future
Maybe not."

-"Col. Kurtz. XXXXXXXXX who discussed the kinetic IO/PSYOP angle mentioned the little arms in a pile incident from Apocalypse Now when making his case to me.
No kidding.
COIN maybe, PSYOP definitely. (If indeed that's what happened.)"

Feb 27, 2012

Infiltration in Afghanistan Issue (Early Birds Get To Be Depressed First)

It is said that there is no security on the net - even among "security" firms (not that Stratfor was ever worth sierra - or was a security co.).

On another topic, glad that we got out there early on the infiltration in AF issue.  Has become quite the natsec crisis recently.  Although some narratives are still hanging on tenuously:

“If the trust, ability and willingness to partner falls apart, you are looking at the endgame here,” said Mark Jacobson, who served until last summer as the NATO deputy senior civilian representative in Kabul.

The killing of the U.S. officers on Saturday occurred two days after a man wearing an Afghan army uniform fatally shot two American troops in eastern Afghanistan, the latest in a string of incidents in recent months in which local security forces have turned against NATO personnel.

And another piece in NYT today. “Afghan good enough” - slogan of the day.


(Although gov/media axis generally is trying to position the story as a "stay the course" and "we can't be pushed out of AF" theme - what can we expect in an election year - doubts as to the viability of the mission are becoming clear even to some of the normally oblivious.)

Feb 14, 2012

LTC. Davis' (U) Report Published in RS

While we were otherwise distracted during our annual SMC-Con at Trump's swanky SoHo tower, the entire unclassified version of LTC Davis' Afghanistan report (84 page PDF) was published in Rolling Stone along with an accompanying piece by Michael Hastings (the correspondent that broke the Bud Light Lime story).

Lots of IO stuff in LTC Davis's report.

 As COL Leap never even considered the American public’s support of the war might have been waning as a direct result of what was physically happening on the battlefield, General Baker likewise fails even to address in his article that the information operations – conceptually a perfectly legitimate and useful tool – must be tied strictly to effective actions on the ground.  It is noteworthy that nowhere in the multi-page essay did the General address, even in passing, that the IO plan is worthless if it does not accurately support the actions and conditions on the ground.  Instead, he emphasizes this to Army troops:
 

For years, commercial advertisers have based their advertisement strategies on the premise that there is a positive correlation between the number of times a consumer is exposed to product advertisement and that consumer’s inclination to sample the new product.  The very same principle applies to how we influence our target audiences when we conduct COIN.

It is remarkable to consider that a senior ranking officer in the United States Army emphatically suggests that standard marketing strategies are the “very same” for combat operations, and yet it is also very telling.  In explaining why a certain operation run by the 1st Armored Division was successful, he cited exclusively the actions the IO staff undertook, implying the actions of the combat troops had either little or no real impact on their success.

Dec 11, 2011

High-stakes Hilarity (the ongoing progression of)

NYT says PAK Taliban in talks with gov.

WaPo says PAK Taliban not in talks with gov.

While we are dealing with the region, Crocker articulates the tailored narrative regarding last week's attack against Shiites in Kabul.  Says we have no idea who did it.  But it wasn't the group claiming responsibility.  And that the attack won't spawn sectarian violence.  Ambassador psychic?  Wishful thinking?  Something else?

PS Scuttlebutt months ago was that a RQ-170 (equipped with science modules) was flown over Fukushima from a base in S. Korea.

Loved the ZH quip re the Iran flap: "The good news is we will all be able to buy a personal drone at Wal Mart in 6-9 months."

Jun 30, 2011

Clusterfuck Grim



That Afghan clusterfuck is getting grim. (Just talking about the political stuff, Karzai's openly daring us to GTFO, knowing full well that he would be dead within a week.

That is if he stayed - which he wouldn't.


This means that he knows we ain't going nowhere.

General Dostum is a non-starter. (A worse war criminal than even the U.S. can get away w/ backing. And our boy, Abdullah, is from the wrong tribe.)

Alas.

(I do love tweakin' the gurlz & boyz. Muzt be eazily amuzed.)

PS

So now, -- just how the Devil tastes this particular flavo[u]r of the Victorian? Artifact? [sic, recte artefact] ;)

Jun 28, 2011

Counterinsurgency Scorecard: New RAND study on Afghanistan

The failure to disrupt the insurgents' tangible support needs was identified as a biggie. The lack of "good governance" and legitimacy of Karzai government are also bothersome to RAND.

Oh, and about that "scorecard", Afghanistan is given a 3.5, which is lower than the lowest-scoring COIN win [a 5], but higher than the highest-scoring loss [a 0].

So there you have it.

Counterinsurgency Scorecard: Afghanistan in Early 2011 Relative to the Insurgencies of the Past 30 Years [27-page PDF]

The previously published RAND monograph, Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency, used detailed case studies of the 30 insurgencies worldwide begun and completed between 1978 and 2008 to analyze correlates of success in counterinsurgency (COIN). A core finding was that a case's score on a scorecard of 15 equally weighted good and 12 equally weighted bad COIN factors and practices perfectly predicted the outcome of those 30 insurgencies. That is, the balance of good and bad factors and practices correlated with either a COIN win (insurgency loss) or a COIN loss (insurgency win) in the overall case. Using the scorecard approach as its foundation, a RAND project sought to extend the findings to the case of Afghanistan in early 2011. The effort involved an expert elicitation, or Delphi, exercise in which experts were asked to make "worst-case" assessments of the factors to complete the scorecard for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The consensus results revealed that early 2011 Afghanistan scores in the middle of the historical record in terms of COIN wins and losses: Its score was lower than that in the lowest-scoring historical COIN win but higher than that in the highest-scoring COIN loss. This suggests an uncertain outcome in Afghanistan, but the findings may help provide additional guidance as operations continue.

Jun 11, 2011

Black Market Narrative Breaking Down?

Concerned over the growing pattern of Afghan soldiers and police officers attacking their coalition counterparts, the American military is sending 80 counterintelligence agents to Afghanistan to help stem the threat of Taliban infiltration in the Afghan National Security Forces, military officials said Friday. 

...

Since March 2009, at least 57 people, including 32 American troops, have been killed in at least 19 attacks in which Afghan service members have turned their weapons on coalition forces. Another 64 were wounded. The totals do not include the attackers, many of whom were killed in shootouts or in suicide blasts. 



(Wha? Thought it was just a matter of black mkt uniforms. Narrative breaking down?)


The attacks have continued despite efforts to improve screening of recruits and crack down on the illegal sales of police and army uniforms. 
...

Whether the infiltration is widespread, the claims are hard to contest, and serve to shake popular confidence in the growing army and police forces. 

Adding to that distrust is the problem of Afghan soldiers and police officers — and impostors dressed like them — attacking military installations and government compounds. 

(Whew, thats better.  Gotta have that rigor in messaging.)

May 4, 2011

Double-Crossed Into Lending That Promised Hand

Paks were involved, but were double-crossed as to target. (BTW, the media is saying how brave it was for Obama to have ordered the SOF assault instead of dropping bombs. They do not know that there have been other similar raids.)

Pak-based terrorist groups know Pakistan was involved in op, and shit's about to get real over there. You can understand them for asking just what the Pak mil was up to during the "40 minute firefight" and exfil when they had their "West Point" right next door?

The emphasis on DOCEX narrative is clearly to spook AQ associates - good move, but they are laying it on way too think. When dingbat local radio announcers are proclaiming expertise in the matter, time to tone it down. Transparent as hell.

Noteworthy is the hilarious walking back of more and more details. Particularly Brennan's shameless bullshittery about UBL hiding behind a woman. Amateur hour at the PSYOP shop? Also, the "living in luxury" theme. I've seen auto repair shops in Alhambra that were more luxurious than the Abbottabad blockhouse. Real deal is that UBL probably was bedridden and hooked up to a dialysis machine.

Pressing issue now (h/t ZH) is whether the currents will take the body close enough to the East coast of Japan for the radiation to revive him - thus making him unkillable, and twice as pissed off. Oh, and the courier business is just the cover story. UBL was tracked down from his PSN account information. ;-)

Seriously though, we are gonna have to see an asset issue -- an official edict that burials at sea are OK for Muslims. Apparently it is only kosher when the believer dies at sea too far from land to hygienically keep the body for later land burial. Under no circumstances is someone to be taken from land out to sea to be dumped.

I personally couldn't care less if the body was ritually washed by the piss of US servicemen, but there is trouble brewing if OGA strat PSYOP boyz don't get on the job ASAP. 

So, if it is true that Pakistani intelligence was abetting (even if double-crossed to such aid) in offing bin Laden, and kept that matter secret, then we can begin to sort out our fraught relationship with that troubled country on a more equitable, trusting basis. If that turns out not to be the case, then there will be a dreadful reckoning to come.


Apr 28, 2011

More "Black Market Uniform" bullshittery

Gunman Kills Foreign Troops at Kabul Airport

Six NATO service members were killed on Wednesday by a gunman wearing an Afghan Air Force uniform while attending a meeting of foreign and Afghan officers on the military side of Kabul International Airport, according to statements from Afghan and NATO spokesmen.

It was the fourth incident in the past two weeks in which a person wearing an Afghan security force uniform attacked from within a government compound.



Lemme guess, was the inside help Taliban received in the Kandahar jailbreak provided by "persons wearing prison guard uniforms"?

That we are getting Af spokesmen to tow our narrative line following recent incidents is evidence of a thus far well executed IO matrix, although this article does show some slippage

Apr 18, 2011

The Old "Black Market Uniform" Misdirect

I've been meaning to mention this for awhile. This morning's NYT reminded me.

Remember how many of the suicide attacks against American and Iraqi forces in Iraq were attributed to terrorists "wearing Iraqi military uniforms", implying that enemies were simply putting on military or police uniforms to gain access to conduct their attacks?

We did a piece on SMC in 2006 expressing our skepticism about such representations.

We have since received confirmation of our suspicions, follow up investigations nearly always ID'ed the perp[s] as real members of the security forces.

The media have been regurgitating the same narrative in Afghanistan:
It was the latest in a string of attacks targeting Afghan government and military officials in what the Taliban have called the beginning of their spring offensive. On Saturday, a suicide bomber killed five NATO service members in eastern Afghanistan A day earlier, a suicide bomber killed the police chief of Kandahar Province. In both attacks, the bombers were dressed in Afghan army or police uniforms.

The same motive for the media manipulation is in play. To acknowledge that enemies have infiltrated our only hope for a decent exit from the war (such as it is) would cast some doubt about the strategy we are hanging our hats upon.

This is far from our only problem in Afghanistan. Pak sanctuaries, Afghan gov incompetence (and corruption), challenges in getting enough warm bodies to join Afghan mil and police, and dwindling options to address all of these issues are certainly more serious obstacles.

But deluding ourselves is rarely a recipe for success in any endeavor.

Mar 18, 2011

In The Wake Of Davis -- Horseshit (Non-Starter) ROE


ROE like this would clearly be a non-starter. Probably just horseshit to advance Davis' release

An important aspect of the settlement, for the U.S., was that the principal of diplomatic immunity was never formally challenged in Pakistani courts. The Pakistani High Court refused to rule on the question and the trial court didn’t make a finding, either. That was crucial for the U.S., which feared that a legal challenge to its claim of immunity for Davis would expose hundreds of other undercover agents around the world who rely on the legal protection of their formal status as “diplomats.”
The final piece of the settlement may be the most complicated. Pakistani officials say discussions will begin soon with the CIA about the “rules of engagement” in Pakistan. “If it’s a CIA operation, the ISI needs to know,” explained one Pakistani official. The CIA has a roughly similar policy of “declaring” its personnel and operations with some other countries with which it has close intelligence ties, such as Britain, France, Israel and Jordan..

Dec 28, 2010

Syndication in Afghan border area

Interesting spin (positive) being put on these developments by US military.

Kinda funny. When groups of adversaries band together to combat a common enemy, that is pretty much the textbook definition of the shit hitting the fan for somebody.

In the US military's reckoning then, it was a measure of desperation when the Western allies joined with the USSR to fight Hitler. Musta heralded sure victory for the Nazis.

From tomorrow's print NYT:

Rival militant organizations on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border have increasingly been teaming up in deadly raids, in what military and intelligence officials say is the insurgents’ latest attempt to regain the initiative after months of withering attacks from American and allied forces.

and

The Punjabi groups, many of which were created by Pakistani intelligence to fight India’s interests in Kashmir, now appear to be teaming up with Pashtun groups like the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban to fight their creators, the Pakistani intelligence and security services.

Dec 17, 2010

Worst kept secret in town

But the real strategy appears to be for the United States to do most of the work itself — at least until the Pakistanis step up.

The admin goes to great effort to paint Afghanistan as manageable.

The CIA has definitely been saying that the shit is not going well in Afghanistan.

Not to mention what they must be saying about our slow-motion nightmare (not WikiL silly), Pakistan.

PS: I forgot to mention that WaPo had a whole series of pieces starting a week or so ago saying that things in Afghanistan can be handled.  The narrative was carefully handled in Washington.

Sep 17, 2010

PTSD Games -- Blowback of Jagged Blowback Mitigation


I'm sure you all b fully aware of this matter, but sending it along anyway, from an issuance o'  Pravda on da' Potomac born a few foggy bottom'd morns ago - Drug used to treat PTSD raises questions:

It's unclear how many soldiers have died while taking Seroquel, or if the drug definitely contributed to the deaths. White has confirmed at least a half-dozen deaths among soldiers on Seroquel, and he thinks there may be many others.

[...Not just X, but there are studies getting approved involving more heavy stuff like ***-25 and ketamine.]

Sounds like VA et al ain't big on the personnel-intensive "sometimes you must go out of your mind to come to your senses" method of treatment. Yeah, well...

Dig This For Phat Fact-Checking (Kidz)


The Defense Department is attempting to buy the entire first printing - 10,000 copies - of a memoir by a controversial former Defense Intelligence Agency officer so that the book can be destroyed, according to military and other sources.

LMAO.

Reminds me of when Allen Dulles went to Bennett Cerf (head of Random House) and offered to have CIA buy up all the copies of "The Invisible Government" (an expose by David Wise).

Cerf said yes, and named a juicy price for the entire printing.

Then he told Dulles that he intended to publish a second and third edition and as many copies as the public desired.

Nobody ever learns (or remembers) anything in government.

Addendum: Just read the NYT version of my anecdote, says it was John McCone who met with the authors.

This could be true.

But I stand my ground, it was Dulles -- who in retirement could be counted on (see Warren Comm.) -- who met with publisher Bennett Cerf, and was treated to his riposte.

(Post was written ages ago and slated for release during such relevant age. Me laziest of buggers)

Jan 30, 2010

Super-Old News 2 Friendz - Eikenberry's Cables


Buzy friendz,

You may/should have already seen this, but the NYT has gotten copies of AMB Eikenberry's cables* to State complaining about McChrystal's COIN plan. From that morning's paper.

In November 2009, Karl W. Eikenberry, the United States ambassador to Afghanistan and retired Army lieutenant general, sent two classified cables to his superiors in which he offered his assessment of the proposed U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. While the broad outlines of Mr. Eikenberry's cables were leaked soon after he sent them, the complete cables, obtained recently by The New York Times, show just how strongly the current ambassador feels about President Hamid Karzai and the Afghan government, the state of its military, and the chances that a troop buildup will actually hurt the war effort by making the Karzai government too dependent on the United States.

Story: U.S. Envoy’s Cables Show Concerns on Afghan War Plans

*The cables: Ambassador Eikenberry's Cables on U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan

Aug 26, 2009

Abu Yahya 's Strategic PSYOP Pointers - Oh STFU, willya´!


It's kinda ignominious when we are encouraged to take Strategic PSYOP pointers from the likes of this odious dude.

Needless to say, all six of the gambits cited here were dreamed up by our side [and hinted at on Swedish Meatballs Confidential] long before 2007.



From Strategic Insights (Summer 2009), Center for Contemporary Conflict -- Naval Postgraduate School.

"Could Al Qaeda’s Own Strategy to Defeat Itself Actually Work?"
by Carl J. Ciovacco

Abu Yahya al Libi’s importance within Al Qaeda and influence on its strategic decisions cannot be overstated. However, in his video titled "Dots of the Letters" released on September 9, 2007, Abu Yahya sabotaged the terrorist organization from within by providing the United States with six of the most potentially effective policy solutions to combat Al Qaeda to date. While not out of swagger or self-defeating tendencies, Abu Yahya offered these policy recommendations to illustrate just how far off the United States has been in its quest to defeat Al Qaeda. [...]

Since his 2005 escape from Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, Abu Yahya al Libi’s stock within Al Qaeda has continued to rise. As a member of the infamous "Bagram Four" which escaped U.S. custody, Abu Yahya publically defied and embarrassed the United States and gave hope to his fellow jihadists. Overnight he became the jihadist movement’s Robin Hood. He is young, energetic, intelligent, charismatic, well-spoken, and considered by many to be the future of Al Qaeda.

Further strengthening his resume within the jihadist movement, he, unlike Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri, is trained in religion. Abu Yahya is not only a senior member of Al Qaeda and member of its Shari’a Committee, but he has also been dubbed Al Qaeda’s Defense Minister, Theological Enforcer, and the High-Command’s attack dog. In addition, his numerous appearances on as-Sahab, Al Qaeda’s media entity, ranks second only to Zawahiri.
Abu Yahya’s importance within Al Qaeda and influence on its strategic decisions cannot be overstated. Why then would he personally wheel a Trojan Horse into Al Qaeda Central’s compound in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan? This Trojan Horse arrived eight months ago in the form of a 93 minute video where Abu Yahya laid out how the United States could defeat Al Qaeda. In his video titled "Dots of the Letters," the Libyan provided six steps for the United States to win the war of ideas.

Jarret Brachman at the Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, has offered his insights as to why Abu Yahya has provided the United States with Al Qaeda’s weaknesses. He argues that it was neither out of "goodwill nor self-destructive tendencies." Brachman explains Abu Yahya’s actions as an "explosive cocktail of youth, rage, arrogance and intellect," with the purpose of first, exposing how far behind the United States is in competing with Al Qaeda in the war of ideas and second, dispelling fears from within Al Qaeda that the United States will win the war anytime soon. As one of Al Qaeda’s chief strategists, however, Abu Yahya may now be regretting letting this as-Sahab video get away.

[...]

Abu Yayha’s six steps for defeating Al Qaeda are:
  1. Focus on amplifying cases of ex-jihadists who have renounced armed action
  2. Fabricate stories about Jihadist mistakes and exaggerate mistakes when possible
  3. Prompt mainstream Muslim clerics to issue fatwas that incriminate the Jihadist movement and its actions
  4. Strengthen and back Islamic movements far removed from Jihad, particularly those with a democratic approach
  5. Aggressively neutralize or discredit the guiding thinkers of the Jihadist movement
  6. Spin minor disagreements among leaders of Jihadist organizations as being major doctrinal or methodological disputes

Jul 17, 2009

Practical PSYOP Afghanistan

Dead-tree tactical PSYOP - someone is definitely keeping the Risograph busy over there.

U.S. military spokeswoman Captain Elizabeth Mathias said the military had posted and distributed leaflets in Paktika and neighboring Ghazni province calling for his [the missing U.S. soldier in Afghanistan] safe return.

"One of our American guests is missing. Return the guest to his home," reads the leaflet, which includes a phone number and shows a U.S. soldier shaking hands with smiling Afghan children.

Mathias said another leaflet had been distributed which read: "If you do not release the U.S. soldier then you will be hunted." It shows U.S. soldiers kicking in the door of a house.