Revolution In The Revolution--Squeezing Yusuf al-Qaradawi

[Damn right I remember when I first read Debray's treatise--and just who unloaded it on my lap.]

SOME 300 journalists and other staff at IslamOnline, a popular website on Muslim affairs, have been staging a three-week sit-in that has captivated Arab media. Broadcasting it live over the internet, they have been getting support from prominent intellectuals and ordinary fans alike. Every turn of the affair is assiduously shared on Twitter. Their ordeal has been described as a battle for the soul of Islam.

That is an exaggeration. At a less spiritual level, IslamOnline’s mostly Egyptian staff has been wrestling for control of the website with its Qatari owner, the al-Balagh Cultural Society, which is based in Doha, Qatar’s capital, and wants to cut jobs in Cairo and move some of its editorial offices back home. The Cairo staff claim that this is a ploy to take the website in a more conservative direction. The managers in Doha counter that IslamOnline has become too parochially Egyptian and has been straying from its mission to reach out to all Muslims.

But this labour dispute also reflects an Arab cold war that pits Egypt against more radical states. Qatari-owned media such as al-Jazeera and IslamOnline have relentlessly criticised Egypt in recent years, notably for its complicity in Israel’s blockade of Gaza. Some suspect that toning down IslamOnline’s news coverage by reining in its staff, some of whom are close to the Muslim Brothers, who in turn are close to the Islamist Hamas movement that controls Gaza, is a Qatari gesture to Egypt’s government. Others point to longstanding rivalry between Saudis and Qataris, who, it is mooted, may be eager to reduce the influence of a Saudi company that has been helping to run the Cairo website.

IslamOnline began in 1997 as a student project at the University of Qatar with cash from Sheikha Mozah, an enterprising wife of Qatar’s emir, and with an endorsement from the prominent and sometimes controversial Egyptian-born scholar, Yusuf al-Qaradawi. At IslamOnline’s launch, speaking on his extremely popular al-Jazeera religious talk-show, “Sharia and Life”, Mr Qaradawi said its mission to guide Muslims is “the jihad of our era.”

On the whole, this jihad has been a soft one. IslamOnline has to some extent been a lifestyle publication, focusing on how to mix modern life and religion. It offers religious advice without fire and brimstone, tackling sensitive topics such as sexuality conservatively but straightforwardly. Bettina Graf, who writes about the media in the Muslim world, calls it “moralist-conservative and missionary, though not dogmatic.” But it was also, in the words of Khaled Hamza, a reform-minded Muslim Brother, a place were “great intellectual battles” were waged over the future of Islamism, mostly influenced by Mr Qaradawi’s wasatiyyah (centrist) current.

Mr Qaradawi, 84, is sometimes said to be the most influential living Sunni Muslim scholar. He has stirred controversy in the West for endorsing suicide bombings in certain circumstances and for his homophobic views, and has been banned from Britain and the United States. For siding with his Egyptian compatriots against the Qatari management, he has lost his chairmanship of al-Balagh. Some see this as a fall from grace, and wonder if Qatar, which has hosted him for most of his adult life, will now freeze him out. His ideas, notably for tackling Sunni angst over the erosion of traditional religious authority and his attempt to counter millennial strands of Islamism [26-page pdf] with a conservative reformism, may have lost a resounding voice if he is now kept off IslamOnline.

-Jacked& Hacked The Economist

Kenya: No Worries There, Mate

I only turn our attention to Kenya as I remain troubled by freaky memories of giving fire sale golf lessons to a strapped Kenyan ambassador who hoped that learning golf with his embarrassing entry level set of Mizuno clubs would aid in networking his way into the boozing echelons of G8 diplomats.

The impoverished pretender was hopeless at anything even remotely demanding a sober cerebellum's micro-management of hand-eye cooperation, but he never failed at springing for peanuts and two beers each at the hooker-rife Sheraton where we'd savor the highlights of our weekly routine of sneaking on to any given local course for however long it took to be spotted furrowing through the greens with scoliotic swings, only and always to be chased off the grounds by barking representatives of the local master race.

Before each lesson the ambassador's driver would pick me up in a CD tagged black stretch Mercedes and en route to hooking up with ambassador-man for yet another weekly raid I'd pump limo-boy (talking to the limo-boy was verbotten per explicit ambassadorial instruction) for the lo-down on the legation's upstairs/downstairs relations. "Just a matter of time", I thought. "Just a matter of time before the bows and arrows come out." All that was an amazing 20 years ago.

While Western media is having a revelous heyday publishing pictures of culturally hyper-regressing Kenyans armed with bows and arrows (these pictures have been picked up all across the occidental world), I turn to the metrics-men of the insurance industry to size up the lay of that quaking land - for it is often such plodding folk one can count on to deliver less dubiously indulgent and level-headed assessments on matters of reasonable import.

The excerpts below hardly do the complete South African Insurance Times & Investment News article justice so I'd recommend reading it in it's entirety for one of the better situational briefings around, imho.

• Kenya's post-election crisis has significantly damaged the domestic economy and Global Insight has downgraded its 2008 base-line forecast to 4% from a pre-crisis forecast of 6.1%, assuming a quick resolution is found.
  

• The tourism, agriculture, transportation, and communications sectors have been directly hit by the unrest, with knock-on affects rippling through the rest of the economy.
  

• Kenya's budget is also facing considerable pressure on a number of fronts as underlying budget assumptions are tested.
  

• Tribalism, political disharmony, land disputes, and pervasive poverty all have a leading part to play in the current turmoil.
  

• Mediation talks have so far failed and a new team of African leaders, led by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan, has taken over the negotiations.
  

• Possible political solutions include, among others, the formation of an interim unity government with a view to paving the way for a constitutional change, and for President Kibaki to step down and resign himself to a re-run of the election.
  

• Nevertheless, there are key fundamental developments that lend a mitigating factor to the situation and point to a limited long-term impact on the economy. [*]

[*]Kenya's role as the regional hub and its geopolitical importance all bolster long-term growth. Key infrastructural developments, especially within trade and transportation infrastructure, are of categorical regional importance and the fundamental drivers that have led to the 2004-2007 economic revival remain.

The export sectors are well-grounded and developed enough to take advantage of a more competitive exchange rate, and the unique tourism sector remains strong enough to recover.

It is also worthy to note that the economy has grown and pro-business policies have been passed (albeit delayed), despite competition in a split parliament and a strong no vote on the government’s constitutional propositions.

Kenya is at a turning point that will force the country to take a long, hard look inwards.

There is still optimism that a solution will be found in enough time to halt a severe hit to the economy, but even if such a solution is delayed, there is enough strength and opportunity in Kenya's fundamental drivers to support a return to the path of recovery in the long term.

Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance

A new CSIS report deals with today's expanded DOD "non-traditional" security assistance programs, including CT capacity building, post-conflict operations, stabilization and reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance missions.

From Integrating 21st Century Development and Security Assistance [61-page pdf]:

The Task Force welcomes DOD’s commitment to building the capacities of vulnerable developing countries to secure their borders and territories and to mitigate the underlying sources of support for terrorism. A review of regional CT programs in Africa suggests that unity of effort remains elusive at the strategic, organizational, and resource levels. There is a lack of coherent strategic vision and authoritative plans to guide identification of critical U.S. government CT capabilities, to rationalize resources across agency boundaries, and to integrate activities in target countries. At the organizational level, there is a persistent structural misalignment between regionally-based Combatant Commands and State Department country-based approaches, complicating the use of either instrument as an interagency platform. Finally, at the resource level, a failure to invest in the civilian CT capabilities required to improve governance and the rule of law, promote economic and social development, and advance public education, results in an overreliance on military instruments in the Global War on Terror

To promote a more integrated U.S. approach to counterterrorism, the Task Force endorses stronger State/DOD joint strategic planning and coordination at the regional level and recommends that DOD, State and USAID present relevant congressional committees with a joint CT security assistance budget, part of the more comprehensive effort requiring increased Executive Branch budget rationalization and transparency. To overcome organizational obstacles to unity of effort, the Task Force calls for more robust cross-staffing at Combatant Commands, the State Department, and USAID; the creation of interagency CT task forces in U.S. embassies; and additional funding and professional incentives for cross-agency counterterrorism training and exercises. To redress funding gaps, the Task Force recommends interagency formulation of country-specific assistance strategies, the establishment of flexible CT accounts for use by U.S. ambassadors, and increased funding for USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives.

The issue of 1206 [Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 established a new program that gives the Department of Defense the authority to spend up to $200 million (now $300 million) of its own appropriations to train and equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism or stability operations] funding authority was the most contentious facing the Task Force.

Some members questioned DOD’s competence in conducting non-military security training (as proposed by the administration) and worried about the potential militarization of U.S. foreign assistance. They argued that Section 1206 authority should be repealed and more emphasis placed on reforming the FAA to provide more flexible tools to the State Department for such training purposes. Other members disagreed, arguing that Section 1206 represents exactly the kind of innovative and agile mechanisms required to conduct the global war on terrorism. They also noted the historical inability of other agencies to operate in non-permissive environments. These members generally supported the Bush administration’s request to make 1206 authorities permanent and global, to allow DOD training of non-military counterterrorism elements under the provision, and to create a higher resource ceiling for the program.

The Task Force ultimately concluded that Section 1206 does provide a valuable, flexible instrument to meet unanticipated contingencies and opportunities in the struggle against terrorism. The use of such funds, however, has wider foreign policy implications. Accordingly, 1206 authority should be restricted to time-sensitive, emerging threats, require robust State Department concurrence and joint formulation of projects, and be subject to close Congressional oversight. To maximize the effectiveness of the 1206 authority, which currently requires annual reauthorization, Congress should extend 1206 authority over 3-5 years to foster program stability (rather than making it permanent and global) and allow DOD to carry over unspent funds across fiscal years. It should also permit DOD to use such monies in combat zones or other insecure environments to work with non-military internal security forces that typically fall under the Ministry of the Interior (such as constabulary, border police, counterterrorism forces, and coast guards), subject to explicit agreement from the Secretary of State and intense legislative oversight. Over time, Section 1206 authority should be phased out, replaced by a substantial, flexible cross-government contingency fund (notionally within Foreign Military Financing (FMF)) to support current 1206 activities.

(...)

The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) permits U.S. military commanders to use appropriated O&M funds to meet urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs of local populations in areas where U.S. military forces are operating. CERP currently applies only to Iraq and Afghanistan, with temporary authorities granted to DOD in successive supplemental appropriations covering those wars. The Pentagon regards CERP as a critical force protection and engagement tool, fostering a permissive environment for U.S. forces in SSTR and counter-insurgency operations. Overall CERP has been a reasonably successful instrument at the disposal of U.S. commanders to deliver goods and services rapidly and elicit local cooperation. The Building Global Partnership legislation submitted to Congress would permit commanders to use CERP funds for urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance to local populations anywhere that U.S. forces are operating.

CERP was created to provide U.S. commanders in Iraq with an instrument to help bring stability to Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion, by providing tangible benefits to the Iraqi people. The initial funding for the program came from the hundreds of millions of dollars in cash discovered by the 3rd Infantry Division and other U.S. forces in the vaults of Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist Party. U.S. commanders had been frustrated by their inability, in the vacuum that resulted following the collapse of Iraqi public institutions, to meet massive emergency needs, from removing trash to restoring basic sanitation and public health, distributing rations, and repairing schools. On May 7, 2003, the Coalition Commander issued an order to establish a “Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Recovery Program to Directly Benefit the Iraqi People.” In June 2003, Ambassador Paul Bremer, the newly arrived Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), gave the program its current name and delegated authority over its use to the Coalition Commander. The establishing memo declared: “This Program will enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility, by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people and support the reconstruction of Iraq."

Under initial guidance, permissible uses of CERP funds included the building, repair, reconstitution, and reestablishment of the social and material infrastructure in Iraq. This included, but was not limited to, the following: water and sanitation infrastructure, food production and distribution, healthcare, education, electricity, telecommunications, transportation, economic and financial management, the rule of law, effective governance, irrigation systems, civic improvement, and repairs to cultural facilities. Prohibited expenditures* fell into several categories: expenses of direct or indirect benefit of CJTF-7 (including coalition) forces; entertainment of the local Iraqi population; weapons buy-back or rewards program; purchase of firearms, ammunition, or removal of UXO; duplication of services available through municipal governments; support to individuals or private businesses (with some exceptions, e.g., repair of damage caused by the coalition); and salaries, pensions or emergency payments to civil service. Each division commander was provided with $500,000 and each brigade commander $200,000 in CERP funds and instructed to coordinate all projects with regional CPA offices, governorate support teams, and Civil Affairs teams, and to submit weekly expense reports.

* In September 2005, this list of prohibited activities was extended to include “providing goods, services, or funds to national armies, national guard forces, border security forces, civil defense forces, infrastructure protection forces, highway patrol units, police, special police, or intelligence or other security forces”; “training, equipping, or operating costs of Iraqi or Afghan security forces”; and “conducting psychological operations, information operations, or other U.S. coalition, or Iraqi/Afghanistan Security Force operations.”

(...)

Among the uniformed military services, support for the HA [Humanitarian Assistance] mission is strongest within the Marine Corps, light infantry of the Army and National Guard, and the indirect action portion of the Special Operations Forces, which focuses on civil affairs and psychological operations. Among the geographic Combatant Commands, the humanitarian assistance mission has found a receptive audience both in CENTCOM, which is deeply involved in stability and counter-insurgency operations, as well as in the so-called “economy of force” commands, including PACOM, SOUTHCOM, and now AFRICOM, a large share of whose mandate includes responding to humanitarian crises.

Let Slip the Dog of War

French mercenary Bob Denard, British author Frederick Forsyth's source of inspiration for the novel The Dogs Of War, died Saturday in Paris.

Though never confirmed or admitted, many of Denard's exploits are widely assumed to have had the tacit approval of French authorities, who were anxious to maintain French influence in Africa.

The suspicion that he was regarded with leniency in his home country grew stronger in 1993 when a five-year French prison sentence over a failed 1977 coup attempt in Benin was reduced to a suspended sentence.

His final French conviction - for a 1995 coup attempt in the Comoros - also earned him a suspended sentence.

This was later increased by an appeal court to a year in jail with three suspended - but he never served it because of ill health.

In 1999, Denard - then 70 - was tried in connection with the assassination of Comoran President Ahmed Abdallah 10 years earlier. He was cleared.

During a trial on appeal in 2006, a former head of the foreign intelligence service said:

When special services are unable to undertake certain kinds of undercover operation, they use parallel structures. This was the case of Bob Denard.

"Cry 'Havoc,' and let slip the dogs of war."

-William Shakespeare
Julius Caesar, Scene I, Act III

China - So Soft, So Cuddly

[I]f China at home is like America during the Industrial Revolution - struggling to develop rules for its chaotic factories - China abroad resembles the US of that time, too: a far more influential nation than other existing powers (19th century Britain, or today's United States) care to admit.

Beijing has launched a soft power offensive, which focuses on public diplomacy and cultural outreach. It will build some 100 Confucius Institutes, Chinese language schools at leading local universities from Melbourne to Nairobi, and it has begun offering large scholarships for students from developing nations to come to China for university. It has created a new breed of diplomats, retiring older, more ideological envoys and replacing them with younger English speakers willing to interact with local media, like in Thailand, where the Chinese ambassador frequently appears on Thai talk shows.

China then backs up this on-the-ground diplomacy with frequent visits by top officials. Wen Jiabao and Hu Jintao have been visiting Africa nearly every year - in sharp contrast to most American cabinet officials.

Chinese officials are skilfully playing the trade game. In Asia, it has taken the lead on trade negotiations from Japan, pushing through a free trade agreement with ten Southeast Asian nations even as both Tokyo and Washington struggle to hammer out trade deals in Asia. In Africa, it has become the continent's third-largest trading partner, its massive demand for commodities has revived African economies like Zambia, and it has created a state investment fund that might plow some $200bn into companies in other nations. In Latin America, the traditional backyard of the United States, China has signed a free trade deal with Chile and launched a strategic economic partnership with regional giant Brazil.

Some of these efforts are paying off. In a recent study by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, most people polled in Africa and Latin America said that China had a more positive impact on their nation than the United States.

Even in Australia, a longtime US ally, a study by the Lowy Institute showed nearly 70% of Australians viewed China positively; only half the Australians polled had positive feelings about the United States.
-Jacked & Hacked Joshua Kurlantzick

Hey Darfur-Saving Clooney et Hollywood al, Remember Somalia?

In 1992 U.S. commandos “stormed” the beaches of Somalia in what was known as Operation Restore Hope. The United States was invading Somalia to, as was told to the public, restore law and order to a country devastated by anarchy, and to feed the population. As then-President George H. W. Bush told the nation in a televised address on December 4, 1992:

“I want to talk to you today about the tragedy in Somalia and about a mission that can ease suffering and save lives. Every American has seen the shocking images from Somalia. The scope of suffering there is hard to imagine. Already, over a quarter of a million people--as many people as live in Buffalo, New York--have died in the Somali famine. In the months ahead, five times that number, 1.5 million people could starve to death…There is no government in Somalia. Law and order have broken down--anarchy prevails.”

Here seemed to be another worthy humanitarian cause. But why would Bush, who spent an entire career in public office untroubled by poverty and hunger at home and abroad, suddenly be so moved to fight famine in Somalia?

Across Africa similar crises were causing mass devastation, yet U.S. Marines were not dispatched to deal with these humanitarian crises. For instance, Human Rights Watch reported on Mozambique:

“…The disappearance of any form of effective government throughout most rural areas of the country has appeared to draw closer by the month. The severe drought of 1991-1992 undermined the unified command of both armies, as soldiers turned to looting and pillaging to provide for themselves. Relief agencies are already describing Mozambique as ‘the next Somalia.’”

So why was Somalia the chosen country? The mainstream media applauded the administration’s efforts at humanitarian intervention, and seemingly not a critical murmur was sounded as to why Somalia was chosen over Mozambique, Ethiopia, Angola or countless other nations.

A 1993 Los Angeles Times article offered a clue. This article was completely ignored by other media outlets, yet gave critical insight into an important resource Somalia had – oil. According to the article, “Nearly two-thirds of Somalia was allocated to the American oil giants Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips in the final years before Somalia's pro-U.S. President Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown..." This article also called into question Conoco’s cozy relationship with the U.S. government, pointing out that the U.S. had leased its de facto embassy from the corporation.

Newly-declassified State Department documents [The Conoco Somalia Declassification Project] offer more evidence concerning the significance of oil behind the intervention. The documents, released in response to two Freedom of Information Act requests [by Keith Yearman], highlight the role Conoco played in the years leading up to the invasion and also briefly highlight Conoco’s support for U.S. government operations in the country.

Civil war brought the downfall of Siad Barre in January 1991. The conflict prompted the U.S. and most other nations to close their embassies, and for most oil companies to cease exploration efforts. On July 27, 1990 Conoco suspended operations briefly when its security captain and a fuel truck driver were shot and killed. By April 1991 Conoco notified the State Department it was ready to restart operations. The economic gains would have been great – perhaps even surpassing Hunt Oil’s windfall in Yemen (which was pumping some 200,000 barrels per day in the late 1980s). According to a June 20, 1991 cable from Richard Barrett, then-U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti, “[A source] claims to have seen an internal document of Conoco (Somalia), which states that sites in the Garoe – Las Anod area are capable of producing 300,000 barrels of oil per day…A confirmed strike could pre-empt moves toward reconciliation…It could also set off battles between clans for control of land where drilling is expected.”

Conoco’s Support

Conoco had long been providing support to State Department missions, from providing space on corporate aircraft traveling to Mogadishu, to housing and feeding State Department and other government employees, to even arranging security for government personnel. Some examples of Conoco’s support:

• From a May 21, 1991 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi: “Two USG [U.S. government] employees would travel to Mogadishu several days after Conoco re-occupies its offices on June 4…USG employees would be welcome to stay with Conoco and would be protected throughout their stay by Conoco’s private guard service.”

• From an October 9, 1991 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi: “Embassy is in daily contact with Conoco (Somalia), Ltd...During four visits by USG officials to Mogadishu over the past several months, Conoco (Somalia), Ltd. has provided the following security: USG officials are met at the airport by armed guards and escorted via convoy to the Conoco residence…USG officials move about Mogadishu as little as necessary. When they do, they are provided with armed guards. USG officials sleep and take their meals at the Conoco compound. When they leave Mogadishu, they are again escorted to the airport via convoy under armed guard…The aircraft…is in constant radio contact with the Conoco compound while in flight, which further facilitates security…”

• From an October 11, 1991 cable from the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi (discussing plans for an assessment mission to arrive the following week): “Conoco, a non-USG entity, has basically given the ‘green light’ for this mission. It is not Conoco’s call to do so. Conoco security is excellent. Their guards are well-paid and well-armed…” Concerned that the security situation might deteriorate, Deputy Chief of Mission E. Michael Southwick warned “someone could get hurt. If the latter be the case, Conoco, which has no legal responsibility to protect official USG personnel, will say ‘we tried our best’ and the USG is faced with both an embarrassing political and legal dilemma. A mission of this importance may warrant the use of U.S. military or DS [Diplomatic Security Service] Security assets.”

The assessment mission visited Mogadishu from October 17 – 20, 1991, ostensibly to evaluate the political and security situation in Somalia. The U.S. Embassy had been closed due to civil unrest, and the delegation was tasked with reviewing properties for a small diplomatic mission. According to the October 22, 1991 summary of the delegation:

"There are, at present, few American citizens in Somalia. Conoco (Somalia), Ltd., however, anticipates re-commencing oil exploration work in southern Somalia within the next several months. According to Conoco, this would involve the introduction of 50-60 Amcit employees into Somalia. If the security situation does not deteriorate, it would be realistic to project a total presence of around 100 Amcits in southern Somalia by the middle of 1992. Such a community would justify a consular presence in Mogadishu.

"There are, at present, only two US firms (Conoco and Turnkey) operating in Somalia. Others, especially in the oil sector, are considering resuming operations. These firms will sometimes require the type of diplomatic support best provided by a permanent diplomatic mission.”

In early December 1992, the State Department leased Conoco’s headquarters to serve as the new diplomatic mission (technically the U.S. Liaison Office). The State Department would pay Conoco $41,260 for six months rent. As Michael Parenti noted in Against Empire, “U.S. taxpayers were paying for the troops in Somalia to protect Conoco's interests, and they were paying the corporation for the privilege of doing so."

By mid-December, arrangements were made for " a letter of appreciation from President Bush to the president of Conoco for the tremendous support that Conoco as a corporation and Raymond Marchand [of Conoco (Somalia), Ltd.] as an individual have provided here."

We know how Somalia turned out – with U.S. soldiers dragged through the streets, the U.S. withdrawal, and with oil companies still hungry for Somali crude. During the occupation of Iraq, with the president’s secret energy task force, high oil prices, and the unquestioned power and influence of the oil companies, both the reasons for and lessons from Somalia must be fresh in our minds.

In case you missed the link earlier in this post, The Conoco Somalia Declassification Project is available here and is posted online for the first time (published 2007-06-25).

As of now, no documents concerning the initial contact between Conoco and the US government concerning Operation Restore Hope have been made available. This initial contact came in at least 1991, as is demonstrated in the project's "Mogadishu Assessment Mission, Oct. 17-20: Preliminary Report"pdf (22 October 1991).

Hacked Excerpt Of An Article At NarcoSphere By Keith Yearman. Fine work, Keith!

Darfur? It’s the Oil, Clooney...Err Stupid

China and USA in New Cold War over Africa’s oil riches


To paraphrase the famous quip during the 1992 US Presidential debates, when an unknown William Jefferson Clinton told then-President George Herbert Walker Bush, “It’s the economy, stupid,” the present concern of the current Washington Administration over Darfur in southern Sudan is not, if we were to look closely, genuine concern over genocide against the peoples in that poorest of poor part of a forsaken section of Africa.

No. “It’s the oil, stupid.”

Hereby hangs a tale of cynical dimension appropriate to a Washington Administration that has shown no regard for its own genocide in Iraq, when its control over major oil reserves is involved. What’s at stake in the battle for Darfur? Control over oil, lots and lots of oil.

The case of Darfur, a forbidding piece of sun-parched real estate in the southern part of Sudan, illustrates the new Cold War over oil, where the dramatic rise in China’s oil demand to fuel its booming growth has led Beijing to embark on an aggressive policy of – ironically – dollar diplomacy. With its more than $1.3 trillion in mainly US dollar reserves at the People`s Bank of China, Beijing is engaging in active petroleum geopolitics. Africa is a major focus, and in Africa, the central region between Sudan and Chad is priority. This is defining a major new front in what, since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, is a new Cold War between Washington and Beijing over control of major oil sources. So far Beijing has played its cards a bit more cleverly than Washington. Darfur is a major battleground in this high-stakes contest for oil control.

China Oil diplomacy

In recent months, Beijing has embarked on a series of initiatives designed to secure long-term raw materials sources from one of the planet’s most endowed regions – the African subcontinent. No raw material has higher priority in Beijing at present than the securing of long term oil sources.

Today China draws an estimated 30% of its crude oil from Africa. That explains an extraordinary series of diplomatic initiatives which have left Washington furious. China is using no-strings-attached dollar credits to gain access to Africa’s vast raw material wealth, leaving Washington’s typical control game via the World Bank and IMF out in the cold. Who needs the painful medicine of the IMF when China gives easy terms and builds roads and schools to boot?

In November last year Beijing hosted an extraordinary summit of 40 African heads of state. They literally rolled out the red carpet for the heads of among others Algeria, Nigeria, Mali, Angola, Central African Republic, Zambia, South Africa.

China has just done an oil deal, linking the Peoples Republic of China with the continent's two largest nations - Nigeria and South Africa. China's CNOC will lift the oil in Nigeria, via a consortium that also includes South African Petroleum Co. giving China access to what could be 175,000 barrels a day by 2008. It’s a $2.27 billion deal that gives state-controlled CNOC a 45% stake in a large off-shore Nigeria oil field. Previously, Nigeria had been considered in Washington to be an asset of the Anglo-American oil majors, ExxonMobil, Shell and Chevron.

China has been generous in dispensing its soft loans, with no interest or outright grants to some of the poorest debtor states of Africa. The loans have gone to infrastructure including highways, hospitals, and schools, a stark contrast to the brutal austerity demands of the IMF and World Bank. In 2006 China committed more than $8 billion to Nigeria, Angola and Mozambique, versus $2.3 billion to all sub-Saharan Africa from the World Bank. Ghana is negotiating a $1.2 billion Chinese electrification loan. Unlike the World Bank, a de facto arm of US foreign economic policy, China shrewdly attaches no strings to its loans.

This oil-related Chinese diplomacy has led to the bizarre accusation from Washington that Beijing is trying to “secure oil at the sources,” something Washington foreign policy has itself been preoccupied with for at least a Century.

No source of oil has been more the focus of China-US oil conflict of late than Sudan, home of Darfur.

Sudan oil riches

Beijing’s China National Petroleum Company, CNPC, is Sudan’s largest foreign investor, with some $5 billion in oil field development. Since 1999 China has invested at least $15 billion in Sudan. It owns 50% of an oil refinery near Khartoum with the Sudan government. The oil fields (see graphic) are concentrated in the south, site of a long-simmering civil war, partly financed covertly by the United States, to break the south from the Islamic Khartoum-centered north.

CNPC built an oil pipeline from its concession blocs 1, 2 and 4 in southern Sudan, to a new terminal at Port Sudan on the Red Sea where oil is loaded on tankers for China. Eight percent of China’s oil now comes from southern Sudan. China takes up to 65% to 80% of Sudan’s 500,000 barrels/day of oil production. Sudan last year was China’s fourth largest foreign oil source. In 2006 China passed Japan to become the world’s second largest importer of oil after the United States, importing 6.5 million barrels a day of the black gold. With its oil demand growing by an estimated 30% a year, China will pass the US in oil import demand in a few years. That reality is the motor driving Beijing foreign policy in Africa.

A look at the southern Sudan oil concessions shows that China’s CNPC holds rights to bloc 6 which straddles Darfur, near the border to Chad and the Central African Republic. In April 2005 Sudan’s government announced it had found oil in South Darfur whoich is estimated to be able when developed to pump 500,000 barrels/day. The world press forgot to report that vital fact in discussing the Darfur conflict.

Using the genocide charge to militarize Sudan’s oil region

Genocide was the preferred theme, and Washington was the orchestra conductor. Curiously, while all observers acknowledge that Darfur has seen a large human displacement and human misery and tens of thousands or even as much as 300,000 deaths in the last several years, only Washington and the NGO’s close to it use the charged term “genocide” to describe Darfur. If they are able to get a popular acceptance of the charge genocide, it opens the possibility for drastic “regime change” intervention by NATO and de facto by Washington into Sudan’s sovereign affairs.

The genocide theme is being used, with full-scale Hollywood backing from the likes of pop stars like George Clooney, to orchestrate the case for a de facto NATO occupation of the region. So far the Sudan government has vehemently refused, not surprisingly.

The US Government repeatedly uses “genocide” to refer to Darfur. It is the only government to do so. US Assistant Secretary of State Ellen Sauerbrey, head of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, said during a USINFO online interview last November 17, "The ongoing genocide in Darfur, Sudan – a 'gross violation' of human rights – is among the top international issues of concern to the United States." The Bush administration keeps insisting that genocide has been going on in Darfur since 2003, despite the fact that a five-man panel UN mission led by Italian Judge Antonio Cassese reported in 2004 that genocide had not been committed in Darfur, rather that grave human rights abuses were committed. They called for war crime trials.

Merchants of death

The United States, acting through surrogate allies in Chad and neighboring states has trained and armed the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army, headed until his death in July 2005, by John Garang, trained at US Special Forces school at Fort Benning, Georgia.

By pouring arms into first southern Sudan in the eastern part and since discovery of oil in Darfur, to that region as well, Washington fuelled the conflict that led to tens of thousands dying and several million driven to flee their homes. Eritrea hosts and supports the SPLA, the umbrella NDA opposition group, and the Eastern Front and Darfur rebels.

There are two rebel groups fighting in Sudan's Darfur region against the Khartoum central government of President Omar al-Bashir – the Justice for Equality Movement (JEM) and the larger Sudan Liberation Army (SLA).

In February 2003 the SLA launched attacks on Sudan government positions in the Darfur region. SLA Secretary-General Minni Arkou Minnawi called for armed struggle, accusing the government of ignoring Darfur. "The objective of the SLA is to create a united democratic Sudan.” In other words, regime change in Sudan. The US Senate adopted a resolution in February 2006 that requested North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in Darfur, as well as a stronger U.N. peacekeeping force with a robust mandate. A month later, President Bush also called for additional NATO forces in Darfur. Uh huh... Genocide? Or oil?

The Pentagon has been busy training African military officers in the US, much as it has for Latin American officers for decades. Its International Military Education and Training (IMET) program has provided training to military officers from Chad, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Cameroon and the Central African Republic, in effect every country on Sudan’s border. Much of the arms that have fuelled the killing in Darfur and the south have been brought in via murky, protected private “merchants of death” such as the notorious former KGB operative, now with offices in the US, Victor Bout. Bout has been cited repeatedly in recent years for selling weapons across Africa. US Government officials strangely leave his operations in Texas and Florida untouched despite the fact he is on the Interpol wanted list for money laundering.

US development aid for all Sub-Sahara Africa including Chad, has been cut sharply in recent years while its military aid has risen. Oil and the scramble for strategic raw materials is the clear reason. The region of southern Sudan from the Upper Nile to the borders of Chad is rich in oil. Washington knew that long before the Sudanese government.

Chevron’s 1974 oil project

US oil majors have known about Sudan’s oil wealth since the early 1970’s. In 1979, Jafaar Nimeiry, Sudan head of state, broke with the Soviets and invited Chevron to develop oil in the Sudan. That was perhaps a fatal mistake. UN Ambassador George H.W. Bush had personally told Nimeiry of satellite photos indicating oil in Sudan. Nimeiry took the bait. Wars over oil have been the consequence ever since.

Chevron found big oil reserves in southern Sudan. It spent $1.2 billion finding and testing them. That oil triggered what is called Sudan’s second civil war in 1983. Chevron was target of repeated attacks and killings and suspended the project in 1984. In 1992, it sold it's Sudanese oil concessions. Then China began to develop the abandoned Chevron fields in 1999 with notable results.

But Chevron is not far from Darfur today.

Chad oil and pipeline politics

Condi Rice’s Chevron is in neighboring Chad, together with the other US oil giant, ExxonMobil. They’ve just built a $3.7 billion oil pipeline carrying 160,000 barrels/day of oil from Doba in central Chad near Darfur Sudan, via Cameroon to Kribi on the Atlantic Ocean, destined for US refineries.

To do it, they worked with Chad “President for life,” Idriss Deby, a corrupt despot who has been accused of feeding US-supplied arms to the Darfur rebels. Deby joined Washington’s Pan Sahel Initiative run by the Pentagon’s US-European Command, to train his troops to fight “Islamic terrorism.” The majority of the tribes in Darfur region are Islamic.

Supplied with US military aid, training and weapons, in 2004 Deby launched the initial strike that set off the conflict in Darfur, using members of his elite Presidential Guard who originate from the province, providing the men with all terrain vehicles, arms and anti-aircraft guns to Darfur rebels fighting the Khartoum government in the southwest Sudan. The US military support to Deby in fact had been the trigger for the Darfur bloodbath. Khartoum reacted and the ensuing debacle was unleashed in full tragic force.

Washington-backed NGO’s and the US Government claim unproven genocide as a pretext to ultimately bring UN/NATO troops into the oilfields of Darfur and south Sudan. Oil, not human misery, is behind Washington’s new interest in Darfur.

The “Darfur genocide” campaign began in 2003, the same time the Chad-Cameroon pipeline oil began to flow. The US now had a base in Chad to go after Darfur oil and, potentially, co-opt China’s new oil sources. Darfur is strategic, straddling Chad, Central African Republic, Egypt and Libya.

US military objectives in Darfur – and the Horn of Africa more widely – are being served at present by the US and NATO backing of the African Union troops in Darfur. There NATO provides ground and air support for AU troops who are categorized as “neutral” and “peacekeepers.” Sudan is at war on three fronts, each country – Uganda, Chad, and Ethiopia – with a significant US military presence and ongoing US military programs. The war in Sudan involves both US covert operations and US trained “rebel” factions coming in from South Sudan, Chad, Ethiopia and Uganda.

Chad’s Deby looks to China too

The completion of the US and World Bank-financed oil pipeline from Chad to the Cameroon coast was designed as one part of a far grander Washington scheme to control the oil riches of central Africa from Sudan to the entire Gulf of Guinea.

But Washington’s erstwhile pal, Chad’s President for Life, Idriss Deby, began to get unhappy with his small share of the US-controlled oil profits. When he and the Chad Parliament decided in early 2006 to take more of the oil revenues to finance military operations and beef up its army, new World Bank President, Iraq war architect, Paul Wolfowitz, moved to suspend loans to the country. Then that August, after Deby had won re-election, he created Chad’s own oil company, SHT, and threatened to expel Chevron and Malaysia’s Petronas for not paying taxes owed, and demanding a 60% share of the Chad oil prieline. In the end he came to terms with the oil companies, but winds of change were blowing.

Deby also faces growing internal opposition from a Chad rebel group, United Front for Change, known under its French name as FUC, which he claims is being covertly funded by Sudan. This region is a very complex part of the world of war. The FUC has based itself in Darfur.

Into this unstable situation, Beijing has shown up in Chad with a full coffer of aid money in hand. In late January, Chinese President Hu Jintao made a state visit to Sudan and to Cameroon among other African states. In 2006 China’s leaders visited no less than 48 African states. In August 2006 Beijing hosted Chad’s Foreign Minister for talks and resumption of formal diplomatic ties cut in 1997. China has begun to import oil from Chad as well as Sudan. Not that much oil, but if Beijing has its way, that will soon change.

This April, Chad’s Foreign Minister announced that talks with China over greater China participation in Chad’s oil development were “progressing well.” He referred to the terms the Chinese seek for oil development, calling them, “much more equal partnerships than those we are used to having.”

The Chinese economic presence in Chad, ironically, may be more effective in calming the fighting and displacement in Darfur than any African Union or UN troop presence ever could. That would not be welcome for some people in Washington and at Chevron headquarters, as they would not find the oil falling into their greasy bloody hands.

Chad and Darfur are but part of the vast China effort to secure “oil at the source” across Africa. Oil is also the prime factor in US Africa policy today. George W. Bush’s interest in Africa includes a new US base in Sao Tome/Principe 124 miles off the Gulf of Guinea from which it can control Gulf of Guinea oilfields from Angola in the south to Congo, Gabon, Equitorial Guinea, Cameroon and Nigeria. That just happens to be the very same areas where recent Chinese diplomatic and investment activity has focussed.

“West Africa’s oil has become of national strategic interest to us,” stated US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, Walter Kansteiner already back in 2002. Darfur and Chad are but an extension of the US Iraq policy “with other means” – control of oil everywhere. China is challenging that control “everywhere,” especially in Africa. It amounts to a new undeclared Cold War over oil.
-By F. William Engdahl

The Early Bird ...

We have previously touched upon the U.S. military's plan to reach out to the forgotten continent (see AFRICOM - Not Your Regular Docents de Council of African Museums).

It turns out that the busy folks at the Pentagon aren't even waiting for AFRICOM to formally get up and running in October.

The psy-ops office has set up shop early.

The Pentagon is carrying out information operations with military information support teams deployed to U.S. embassies on the continent. One such operation includes a Web site (http://www.magharebia.com) that provides news and comment directed at North Africa in Arabic, French and English.

P.S. An African news site with podcasts- now that's a show of force!


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AFRICOM - Not Your Regular Docents de Council Of African Museums

A recently released Congressional Research Service (CRS) report (pdf) describes U.S. Government plans to establish a new military command to be known as AFRICOM.

AFRICOM will be responsible for U.S. military forces in Africa, promoting U.S. strategic objectives on the continent in light of "Africa’s growing strategic importance to U.S. interests. Among those interests are Africa’s role in the Global War on Terror and the potential threats posed by ungoverned spaces; the growing importance of Africa’s natural resources, particularly energy resources[.]"

Business Is Business

Three months after the United States successfully pressed the United Nations to impose strict sanctions on North Korea because of the country's nuclear test, Bush administration officials allowed Ethiopia to complete a secret arms purchase from the North, in what appears to be a violation of the restrictions, according to senior American officials.

The United States allowed the arms delivery to go through in January in part because Ethiopia was in the midst of a military offensive against Islamic militias inside Somalia, a campaign that aided the American policy of combating religious extremists in the Horn of Africa. ...

It is also not the first time that the Bush administration has made an exception for allies in their dealings with North Korea. In 2002, Spain intercepted a ship carrying Scud missiles from North Korea to Yemen. At the time, Yemen was working with the United States to hunt members of Al Qaeda operating within its borders, and after its government protested, the United States asked that the freighter be released. Yemen said at the time that it was the last shipment from an earlier missile purchase and would not be repeated.

American officials from a number of agencies described details of the Ethiopian episode on the condition of anonymity because they were discussing internal Bush administration deliberations. ...

Several officials said they first learned that Ethiopia planned to receive a delivery of military cargo from North Korea when the country’s government alerted the American Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia's capital, after the adoption on Oct. 14 of the United Nations Security Council measure imposing sanctions.

"The Ethiopians came back to us and said, 'Look, we know we need to transition to different customers, but we just can’t do that overnight,' " said one American official, who added that the issue had been handled properly. "They pledged to work with us at the most senior levels."

American intelligence agencies in late January reported that an Ethiopian cargo ship that was probably carrying tank parts and other military equipment had left a North Korean port.

The value of the shipment is unclear, but Ethiopia purchased $20 million worth of arms from North Korea in 2001, according to American estimates, a pattern that officials said had continued. The United States gives Ethiopia millions of dollars of foreign aid and some nonlethal military equipment.

After a brief debate in Washington, the decision was made not to block the arms deal and to press Ethiopia not to make future purchases.

U.S. Operated Out of Ethiopia Against Somali Islamists

The outlines of this story aren't exactly news to readers of this blog. See Who's Doing Who - Somalia.

The American military quietly waged a campaign from Ethiopia last month to capture or kill top leaders of Al Qaeda in the Horn of Africa, including the use of an airstrip in eastern Ethiopia to mount airstrikes against Islamic militants in neighboring Somalia, according to American officials.

The close and largely clandestine relationship with Ethiopia also included significant sharing of intelligence on the Islamic militants' positions and information from American spy satellites with the Ethiopian military. Members of a secret American Special Operations unit, Task Force 88, were deployed in Ethiopia and Kenya, and ventured into Somalia, the officials said.

The counterterrorism effort was described by American officials as a qualified success that disrupted terrorist networks in Somalia, led to the death or capture of several Islamic militants and involved a collaborative relationship with Ethiopia that had been developing for years.

But the tally of the dead and captured does not as yet include some Qaeda leaders -- including Fazul Abdullah Mohammed and Fahid Mohammed Ally Msalam -- whom the United States has hunted for their suspected roles in the attacks on American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. With Somalia still in a chaotic state, and American and African officials struggling to cobble together a peacekeeping force for the war-ravaged country, the long-term effects of recent American operations remain unclear.

You Gets No Bread With One Meatball

The Chinese evidently have few scruples. After the United States declared Islamic- governed Sudan a rogue state for harboring Osama Bin Laden, forcing the American companies to abandon their lucrative trade with the country's crude, China was only too happy to fill the void.
Spiegel Online Read more...


Sweden's former prime minister Carl Bildt was one of the first Swede's to point a finger of blame at Osama bin Laden immediately and seemingly on cue after the 911 attack and almost before it's toxic dust came to rest on the streets of Manhattan.

Now Lundin Petroleum for which Carl Bildt peddles his influence for improved fortunes is in celebratory mode as they've resumed their much criticized exploratory activities in the Sudan - a country the United States has labelled a rogue state for harboring Osama bin Laden. The U.S. has subsequently banned all American companies from conducting business under penalty of law.


By the way, how does the average Sven, Ingrid, or naturalized Mohammed of fabled egalitarian IKEA-ville get one of those cards to avoid having their God-cracked asses of many colors extraordinarily renditioned from the Swedish Folkhem to a CIA-sanctioned dungeon of torture in Egypt for suspected financial dealings with rogues and other tanned nasties?

Alas, Alas! So many questions abound and Meatball One just has to know the answers! Does one need friends in duplicitous places and if so just where are those places and who there are the resident patron saints offering refuge and solace de apologetica. for those who merely, and dutifully, endeavor to feed beloved kin with the spoils of enemy collaboration?

So Skål to scruples, Kalle ol´Boy! (I don't know how to say that in any form of Chinese but I guess I'll soon have to learn.)

And here's a little diddy you can sing whenever you find yourself low on funds and left to little but your wits and resumé. I dedicate it to Kalle. Rock on, meatball!

One Meatball
A little man walked up and down,
He found an eating place in town,
He read the menu through and through,
To see what fifteen cents could do.

One meatball, one meatball,
He could afford but one meatball.

He told the waiter near at hand,
The simple dinner he had planned.
The guests were startled, one and all,
To hear that waiter loudly call, "What,

"One meatball, one meatball?
Hey, this here gent wants one meatball."

The little man felt ill at ease,
Said, "Some bread, sir, if you please."
The waiter hollered down the hall,
"You gets no bread with one meatball.

"One meatball, one meatball,
Well, you gets no bread with one meatball."

The little man felt very bad,
One meatball was all he had,
And in his dreams he hears that call,
"You gets no bread with one meatball.

"One meatball, one meatball,
Well, you gets no bread with one meatball."

-Josh White's hit version