Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations

From a new RAND paper, Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations [124-page pdf]:

Ongoing operations and emerging missions create competing demands for the Army’s capabilities, resulting in requirement gaps that the Army is unable to fill by itself. Although there are other ways to fill capability gaps (e.g., with other Services, contractors, or increased Army end-strength), national and Department of Defense (DoD) strategic guidance emphasizes the need to leverage the capabilities of allies and partners to fill these gaps. Thus, this monograph is concerned with how the Army should focus its security cooperation activities to build the most appropriate capabilities in partner armies.

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The monograph ... identifies U.S. Army capability gaps through a review of strategic and operational guidance documents and relevant Army and Joint studies. Because the Army is a supporting entity, its capability gaps reflect Combatant Command (COCOM) requirements, taking into account Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs), and COCOM Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) strategies. The result of the review is a set of relevant capability gaps that may be appropriate for building in partner armies and that form the analytic basis for subsequent chapters.

Next, the monograph provides a five-step process for matching U.S. Army capability gaps with candidate partner armies. It presents a set of criteria to help Army planners select candidate partner armies for training or equipping programs. The five steps are (1) determine the relative importance of capability gaps to the U.S. Army in specific situations, (2) consider the level of effort required to build the capability in a partner army, (3) identify capabilities of shared interest to the U.S. Army and the partner army, (4) identify candidate partner armies based on past participation in U.S.-led operations, and (5) determine existing partner army capabilities. The process aims to help Army planners identify which capabilities are of mutual benefit to the United States and partner nations. Finally, the study team applied the five-step process to the data available for one illustrative TEP [Train and Equip Program] to gauge its predictive ability.

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The study team reviewed studies conducted by Training and Doctrine Command’s (TRADOC) Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and the G-3. In addition, the study team consulted with experts from the Joint Staff to determine if there are additional capability gaps not identified by the Army. The ARCIC, part of TRADOC, produced two of the four studies used by the study team. These two studies—the Capability Needs Analysis (CNA) and the Capability Gap Analysis (CGA)—speak directly to current Army capability gaps. It is important to note that the studies used the Combatant Commanders’ IPLs and the JOpsC as primary sources for identifying these gaps.

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This appendix provides the definitions for the capability gaps identified in Chapter Three. Reproduced here verbatim are the definitions for each capability gap as specified in the three Army studies. ...

C4 and Information Operations

CGA Study
Defined as voice, data, and video communication support to the tactical fight and the capacity and ability to communicate dismounted-to-dismounted, dismounted-to-mounted at a tactical level in all environments. Focused on, but not limited to, battalion level and below. Includes the ability to analyze intelligence and other information and provide that information to units to permit the conduct of operations. Also includes the delivery of timely intelligence information to tactical units or the accessibility by tactical units to this information.

CNA Study
Defined as open architecture C4 systems that are reliable under all circumstances and that operate at extended ranges from deployment through operations in theater and through redeployment. These systems of systems will readily share information throughout the force.

Workshop Discussion
Not discussed. Determined to be for high-end allies or remain organic to the U.S. Army.