Mar 18, 2011

In The Wake Of Davis -- Horseshit (Non-Starter) ROE


ROE like this would clearly be a non-starter. Probably just horseshit to advance Davis' release

An important aspect of the settlement, for the U.S., was that the principal of diplomatic immunity was never formally challenged in Pakistani courts. The Pakistani High Court refused to rule on the question and the trial court didn’t make a finding, either. That was crucial for the U.S., which feared that a legal challenge to its claim of immunity for Davis would expose hundreds of other undercover agents around the world who rely on the legal protection of their formal status as “diplomats.”
The final piece of the settlement may be the most complicated. Pakistani officials say discussions will begin soon with the CIA about the “rules of engagement” in Pakistan. “If it’s a CIA operation, the ISI needs to know,” explained one Pakistani official. The CIA has a roughly similar policy of “declaring” its personnel and operations with some other countries with which it has close intelligence ties, such as Britain, France, Israel and Jordan..

Mar 6, 2011

More On The Boundary Break

Security researchers, meanwhile, say Anonymous has changed the game. "The bar has been raised" with the targeted attack and breach of HBGary, says Marc Maiffret, founder and CTO at eEye Digital Security, who did some black-hat hacking as a teenager. "They may start to do more of that versus just DDoSing."


Maiffret says Anonymous has a large, global identity that includes political activists and hackers. "Rather than different people, they are gravitating to a central identity," he says.
Entirely predicted by the theory. Also, theory does not predict kumbaya environment. Precisely the opposite.

More Stuff You Just Can't Make Up

Bardella, 27, described most reporters as "lazy as hell" and displayed supreme confidence about his ability to place stories favorable to his boss in almost any major news media outlet.
and a WaPo review of that new Bing West book on Afghanistan:
West spreads the blame widely but finds a failure of political culture at the heart of the problem. Endlessly engaged in euphemism and rhetorical triangulation, American generals and politicians insist on a story in which war isn't war and doesn't center on killing. Official doctrine instead declares that professional warriors are engaged in a nation-building strategy "to serve and secure the population," a focus that West argues has "transformed the military into a giant Peace Corps."
JFC! When you have an impossible mission you must define it in possible terms. Career suicide otherwise.

Mar 5, 2011

Disgruntled CP Officials with Access to Secret Docs Posting on Chinese Wikileaks-type Sites

We have been informed that in China disgruntled CP officials and others with access to secret docs have been posting them on myriad Chinese Wikileaks-type sites. Just like the theory predicts. Perfect.

Also that Chinese officials' hands have been forced and they have had to address problems revealed by docs.

And USG thinks they will just bluff, threaten, and punish their way through this.

Gov truly doesn't grasp what is at hand here (even though they have had decades of warning). Although the USA is in a much better position than other security states, given the (ostensibly) open nature of our wider society. The problem for the USG is that with so much bread buttered by the secret state, there will always be pissed off (or suddenly awakened/radicalized) people with access who will take matters into their own hands. Live by big numbers, ...

Speaking of that, some want to know why we haven't let LTC Coombs (BM's atty) in on the specifics of what we (and SMC readers) know. Might be helpful, might not. Not a priority of ours, I answered. Sometimes a US Senator will suffice. (Although the BS about "aiding the enemy" (in the indictment) was kinda special.)

They are trying to send the most serious message to acolytes by the treatment of BM.

It ain't gonna work.

The theory says so.

PS: NSA assumes that they are compromised. Saw it in a doc that was in the HBGary email dump.

The theory would predict that type of OPSEC approach would be a good one (even if they are not in fact compromised).

Also, Russia has its hands full with copycat WLs too - but this has been widely reported, unlike AFAIK the China news

Mar 1, 2011

Contractor Blues (Our Boy Davis Aside)

ISI better hope Davis doesn't choke on a chicken bone.

On t'wards other matters -- decent little interim report [72-page PDF] on the contingency-contracting clusterfuck.

Basic conclusion is that lots of this shit will be on the chopping block.

Some highlights:
Armed private security contractors generally perform one of three roles: static security for facilities and bases, movement security for convoys, and movement security for personnel. Movement security for personnel carries a number of special risks
A serious concern with relying on armed security contractors is a potential gap in legal accountability. Without certain legal accountability, incidents involving contractors may alienate the host nation and undermine attempts at establishing legitimacy. ...

The use of contractors to manage other contractors and the heavy use of armed private security contractors reflect a failure of government to provide for
contingency workforce needs. Congress and federal agencies are obligated to structure the U.S. peacetime workforce to deal with projected mobilization and crisis demands. Personnel shortages in a contingency are not sufficient justification for contracting out high-risk functions after a crisis develops. Securing a standing capability to deploy at the start of a contingency would reduce contract waste, fraud, and abuse such as were conspicuous in early operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Accordingly, the Commission recommends that Congress direct agency heads to:
Recommendation 1
Grow agencies’ organic capacity
Require DoD, State, and USAID to:
▪ Undertake a comprehensive, risk-based, contingency-manpower
assessment to determine the organic resources needed to preserve a
core level of capability, including consideration of the agencies’ ability to
manage any contractors they use.
▪ Submit budget justifications and obtain the hiring authority to
accommodate staffing increases.

The trend toward contracting out security also  reflects the government’s human-resource constraints. With Congressionally mandated  overall force-strength ceilings, and with limits on military force-strength “in theater,” DoD has had to choose between using military personnel or security contractors for force protection. The State Department has limited numbers of diplomatic security agents in its Bureau of Diplomatic Security, while USAID has no organic security capability.

In most cases, private security contractors are used not because they are necessarily more effective or efficient than government security personnel, but because agencies have turned to them by default. If these  agencies attempted to conduct security functions with organic capability, it would require increasing manpower significantly, redirecting military personnel from other missions, or some combination of these options. Another alternative to using private security contractors would be to increase reliance on host-nation government security forces, but this is not currently a realistic option.
Accordingly, the Commission recommends that Congress:
Recommendation 2
Develop a deployable contingency-acquisition cadre
▪ Provide funding and direction for agencies involved in contingency
operations to establish a trained, experienced, and deployable cadre for
acquisition-support functions. The strategic plan for deploying this cadre
should be supported by a back-up capability for making rapid, temporary
hires of acquisition professionals for large-scale or long-term contingency
operations.
Recommendation 3
Restrict reliance on contractors for security
▪ Restrict the reliance on private security contractors by requiring agencies
to more broadly provide embedded government personnel responsible for
leadership, command and control, and oversight of all security contractors
and operations. 

This recommendation does not, however, address the Commission’s abiding
concern that agencies’ reliance on contractors relative to government
personnel is excessive, notably in the realm of movement security
contractors. The Commission’s final report will address that concern.
Recommendation 4
Designate officials with responsibility for cost consciousness
Revise management directives, instructions, and other policies as necessary to:
▪ Ensure that senior officials are specifically designated as being accountable
for contract-cost consciousness, and develop metrics to facilitate
assessment of contract outcomes.
▪ Establish criteria allowing promotion boards and selection panels to
evaluate and reward officials for contract cost consciousness.
 Recommendation 5
Measure senior military and civilian officials’ efforts to manage
contractors and control costs
Revise senior officials’ personnel-evaluation reports to:
▪ Affirmatively state the responsibility to avoid excess cost, accurately
establish contingency-contract support requirements, manage contractor
performance, and revalidate requirements at appropriate stages of the
acquisition process.
▪ ▪ Include an acquisition-management category that is separate from any
existing category to measure officials’ demonstrated commitment to
contractor management and oversight, and to acquisition-cost control....

Defense policy for more than two decades has recognized that contractors—along with military reservists, federal civilians, and host-nation support personnel—are part of the “total force” for contingency operations. But the declared total-force policy that includes contractors is at odds with agencies’ failure to plan for their reliance on contractors...

Supplementing the contingency-contracting function with ad hoc solutions has proven to be ineffective. The Iraq and Afghanistan contingencies have brought many problems with contractors into sharp relief. Solutions demand concerted and continuing leadership attention to ensure that money spent in the future will bring better results. Despite contractors’ constituting almost half the total force deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD contingency-contracting matters have been mixed together with the J-4 logistics directorate and managed by a colonel. At State and USAID, the functions have been relegated to the office-director level.